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Public Participation Without a Public: 




To promote accountability, the order provides a mechanism for the 
White House working group to engage directly with the public, includ-
ing the business community, by establishing a process to solicit input on 
how best to eliminate unnecessary costs.1 
Eighty percent of success is showing up.2  
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The first quote above comes from an op-ed that Cass Sunstein, then 
Administrator of the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA),3 
published on May 1, 2012, in that bastion of deregulatory zeal, the Wall 
Street Journal.4  In his op-ed, Sunstein extolled the virtues of a new executive 
order issued by President Obama designed to promote international harmoni-
zation of regulations.5  The goal of such harmonization is to adopt common 
regulatory standards with other countries in order to facilitate international 
  
 * University Chair in Law, Wake Forest University. 
 ** AT&T Professor of Law, Texas Tech University. 
 1. Cass Sunstein, The White House vs. Red Tape, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 30, 2012), 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702304811304577369934135888006.ht
ml (emphasis added). 
 2. William Safire, On Language; Marry-o?  Mahr-yo?, N.Y. TIMES (July 23, 
1989), http://www.nytimes.com/1989/07/23/magazine/on-language-marry-o-mahr-
yo.html (quoting Woody Allen). 
 3. For those less familiar with the American administrative law landscape, 
OIRA is a division of the Office of Management & Budget, which is housed in the 
White House.  As an arm of the White House that exercises a measure of supervisory 
authority over agency rulemaking, OIRA has been at the center of a longstanding 
debate over the degree to which the President can direct rulemaking by agencies.  It 
has been characterized as “the single most powerful office most people have never 
heard of.”  Stephanie Young, OIRA Chief Sunstein: We Can Humanize, Democratize 
Regulation, HARV. L. REC. (Mar. 12, 2010), http://hlrecord.org/?p=9714 (quoting 
Harvard Law School Dean Martha Minow’s introduction of Administrator Sunstein). 
 4. See Sunstein, supra note 1. 
 5. Id.; see Promoting International Regulatory Cooperation, Exec. Oder No. 
1,360,977, 77 Fed. Reg. 26413 (May 1, 2012). 
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trade.6  But harmonization efforts, conducted by unelected bureaucrats from 
different countries, naturally raise concerns regarding accountability. To as-
suage such concerns, Administrator Sunstein offered administrative law’s 
usual response: We promise to let the “public” participate somehow in the 
rulemaking process.7   
But what if the only members of the “public” who show up are readers 
of the Wall Street Journal?  This concern is far from hypothetical:  corporate 
interests dominate participation in the legislative rulemaking process in the 
United States.8  As such, we might expect Woody Allen’s observation (our 
second opening quote)  to come into play.  If eighty percent of success is 
indeed just a matter of showing up, then public participation schemes de-
signed to promote accountability or to “democratize” rulemaking have the 
potential to distort rulemaking into favoring private, special interests. Deter-
mining the extent of such distortion presents a terrifically difficult problem—
in part because there is no consensus baseline with which to measure depar-
tures from the public interest.  Still, it seems safe to presume that profit-
oriented, corporate interests perceive that they get something worthwhile 
from their large investments in regulatory proceedings—and we are inclined 
to trust this perception.9    
As Isaac Newton taught us long ago, for every action there is an equal 
and opposite reaction.  To the degree that unelected, unaccountable mandar-
ins rule, the people do not.  Regulatory agencies, headed by unelected admin-
istrators, can thus create a “democracy deficit” and, at least for those who 
believe government derives its legitimacy from democracy,, a legitimacy 
deficit, too.  Various polities have addressed this democracy deficit by em-
bedding public administration in “accountability network[s] of rules and pro-
cedures[.]”10  A requirement of public participation is one such procedure 
common to many countries and many situations.  Whether public participa-
tion serves the public, however, depends on many factors, including the par-
  
 6. See, e.g., Sidney A. Shapiro, International Trade Agreements, Regulatory 
Protection, and Public Accountability, 54 ADMIN. L. REV. 435, 436 (2002) (describ-
ing “harmonization” as “the adoption of an international standard that adjusts the 
regulatory standards or procedures of two or more countries until they are the same”). 
 7. See 77 Fed. Reg. 26413 (noting that the Administrator of OIRA, who dou-
bles as the Chair of the Regulatory Working Group charged with fostering harmoniza-
tion, “may solicit input, from time to time, from representatives of business, nongov-
ernmental organizations, and the public”). 
 8. See infra Part III.B (discussing participation by corporate interests and public 
interest groups in the rulemaking process). 
 9. See infra Part III.C (concluding that the evidence is suggestive that corporate 
dominance of regulatory participation biases outcomes in favor of special interests but 
conceding the difficulty of definitive measurement).  
 10. Francesca Bignami, From Expert Administration to Accountability Network: 
A New Paradigm for Comparative Administrative Law, 59 AM. J. COMP. L. 859, 861 
(2011). 
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ticulars of the public participation scheme, the agency’s regulatory tasks, the 
agency’s resources and competence to fulfill those tasks, and the resources 
and leverage of all those persons who may be affected by the agency’s ac-
tions. 
Bearing the preceding points in mind, this brief Article raises three 
broad concerns relating to public participation in rulemaking.  First, to assess 
whether public participation serves the public, it is important to understand 
why such participation is desirable in the first place.  In recent decades, two 
answers in particular have dominated discourse.  Following pluralistic con-
ceptions of democracy, one might say that democracy is the way that multi-
farious private interests that constitute the “public” cut a deal among them-
selves.  Insofar as agency policymaking amounts to coordination of such 
dealmaking, it is legitimized by its democratic nature.11  A deliberative de-
mocracy conception, by contrast, sees public participation as an integral part 
of a process that requires agencies to consider all relevant interests before 
acting and to publicly justify their actions with reasoned explanations.12  The 
debate over which of these conceptions is better remains unresolved, and the 
word “democracy” is certainly fuzzy enough to allow for both.  But, as this 
Article will develop, these conceptions can lead to very different understand-
ings of what public administration ought to be about, and, given a choice, we 
will take deliberation over deals.  
Second, under either conception, there is an elephant in the room in the 
United States: corporate clout.  Empirical work demonstrates that public in-
terest groups only participate in some rulemakings, and when they do partici-
pate, their efforts are overwhelmed by the participation of corporate inter-
ests.13  While less certain as an empirical matter, the evidence also suggests 
that this domination biases the rulemaking process under either conception of 
public participation.14     
Third, bearing these lessons from the American experience in mind, we 
hope that participants at this international forum of administrative law schol-
ars can shed light on how clout affects (or distorts) the operation of public 
participation in administrative policymaking, both in their own home polities 
and in international or global settings.  We are especially interested in hearing 
assessments of how well “new governance” initiatives that hope to “let 
  
 11. See generally Steven P. Croley, Theories of Regulation: Incorporating the 
Administrative Process, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 32 (1998) (describing the pluralistic 
account of agency policymaking and discussing how leading accounts of regulation 
can all be traced back to it). 
 12. See, e.g., Glen Staszewski, Political Reasons, Deliberative Democracy, and 
Administrative Law, 97 IOWA L. REV. 849, 857-58 (2012) (describing deliberative 
democracy theory). 
 13. See, e.g., Wendy Wagner, Katherine Barnes & Lisa Peters, Rulemaking in the 
Shade: An Empirical Study of EPA’s Air Toxic Emission Standards, 63 ADMIN. L. 
REV. 99, 128 (2011); see also infra notes 60-63 and accompanying text.   
 14. See infra § III.B-C. 
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stakeholders develop concrete solutions” seem to play out in practice.15  Do 
these initiatives enable especially powerful stakeholders to distort outcomes 
in their favor?  Why or why not?  Also, circling back to the opening of this 
Article, the potential for harmonization of regulatory requirements to enhance 
economic efficiency is obvious.  However, this process also poses a danger of 
adopting least-common-denominator regulations that fail to protect public 
health and safety sufficiently.  To the degree the “public” (i.e., interested 
parties with sufficient resources) participates in developing international or 
global standards, how big a problem is clout?   
Carrying scars from the American experience, the authors suspect these 
developments may well enhance the clout of powerful special interests, sug-
gesting to us that we should be careful about our enthusiasm for them.  Of 
course, if these developments do enhance clout, then backing away from 
them may prove easier said than done.  We expect that corporate interests 
would use their clout to pursue reliance on new governance and global stan-
dards precisely when they stand to benefit from these moves.  But perhaps we 
are unduly pessimistic.  It may be, as some academic literature indicates, that 
the forces that may counterbalance corporate influence have greater strength 
in other countries,16  
But in the United States, at least, it is past time to think about how to 
address the problem of clout.  This Article views this problem from the per-
spective of those who see public participation primarily as a means of foster-
ing democratic deliberation designed to promote wise, expert, public-
regarding policy choices.  One path to improving the capacity of public par-
ticipation to foster such deliberation might be to strengthen public interest 
groups so that they have the means to respond to corporate participation.17 
Notwithstanding its attractions, this approach must confront some rather ob-
vious problems—e.g., in the unlikely event that Congress ever chose to fund 
public interest groups’ efforts to challenge government action, it would have 
to determine which entities are worthy of its largess.  
This Article therefore closes by suggesting an alternative path for explo-
ration: the government should strengthen the most important public interest 
group of all—the government itself.  Deliberative democracy can only work 
where the rulemaker has the resources necessary to assess independently the 
  
 15. David M. Trubek & Louise G. Trubek, New Governance & Legal Regula-
tion: Complementarity, Rivalry, and Transformation, 13 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 539, 542 
(2007). 
 16. See, e.g., Bignami, supra note 10, at 886-88 (noting that the role of labor, 
industrial, and newer advocacy groups in policymaking “still stands out when con-
trasted with the public-private divide in American administrative law”). 
 17. For efforts along these lines, see, e.g., Sidney Shapiro & Rena Steinzor, Cap-
ture, Accountability, and Regulatory Metrics, 86 TEX. L. REV. 1741 (2008); Sidney A. 
Shapiro, The Complexity of Regulatory Capture: Diagnosis, Causalty, and Remedia-
tion, 17 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 221 (2012) [hereinafter Shapiro, Complexity of 
Regulatory Capture]. 
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efforts of special interests to push regulations in their favor.   Thus, the chief 
bulwark against industry biasing of rulemaking must be an expert civil serv-
ice.  Of course, this path, too, may not be that realistic. No American politi-
cian can go wrong bashing the bureaucracy.  Since the record of the civil 
service does not justify this demonization, we see the problem of clout once 
again.  In a post-Citizens United world,18 it will be difficult, perhaps impossi-
ble at least in the short-run, to overcome the campaign against government by 
political interests that benefit from a lack of government regulation.  But as 
impractical academics, we press on.  
II.  PUBLIC PARTICIPATION LEGITIMIZES, BUT WHY?  
Public participation is commonly said to legitimize government either 
because it creates a pluralistic interest group process or because it results in 
deliberative democracy.19 For reasons explored below, as believers in both 
“expertise” and the “public interest,” we prefer that public administration and 
law aspire to the latter model.20 
In the 1950s, political scientists, reacting to the embarrassingly low vot-
ing rates in the United States, offered a pluralistic account of the legitimacy 
of American government.  This account sees governmental decision making 
as the product of conflict and compromise among interest groups.21  Ulti-
mately, this bargaining legitimizes government, because in the long run, it 
leads to a fair and equitable division of benefits and burdens as long as suffi-
cient groups participate to represent the diverse interests of the public.  Policy 
outcomes that “reflect an equilibrium among all interests” are therefore more 
desirable than outcomes that advantage a particular interest or interests.22   
In his seminal article, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 
Professor Richard Stewart suggested that federal courts in the 1960s and 70s 
sought to embed this pluralistic model into administrative law.23  According 
  
 18. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010) (holding that 
statutory ban on independent corporate expenditures to support or oppose candidates 
for political office violated the First Amendment). 
 19. See, e.g., Richard B. Stewart, Administrative Law in the Twenty-First Cen-
tury, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 437, 445-46 (2003) (discussing the “complementary” role 
that the interest representation and analytic management models play in responding to 
the democracy deficit – notwithstanding “serious tensions” between the two). 
 20. We are mostly unembarrassed by our inability to identify what we mean by 
“public interest” with precision.  We may not always know it when we see it, but we 
often know it when we don’t see it.  See generally Shapiro, Complexity of Regulatory 
Capture, supra note 17, at 223-25 (discussing the difficulty of defining the “public 
interest” and offering a definition of regulatory capture). 
 21. See Croley, supra note 11, at 31-34. 
 22. Id. at 32. 
 23. Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 
HARV. L. REV. 1669, 1712 (1975). 
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to this view, agency policymaking should be a product of bargaining among 
interested parties who may engage in political horse-trading to come to some 
mutually acceptable result.  Legitimacy of agency policymaking has the same 
ultimate source as legislative policymaking – politics.24  The agency aspires 
to be something like an honest broker between interested parties. 
By contrast, the deliberative-democratic model understands public par-
ticipation as a means of fostering broadly democratic, reasoned conversations 
among agencies and outsiders that ultimately lead to better policymaking in 
the public interest.25  Requiring agencies to listen to the voice of the people – 
or at least the voices of those people who show up – treats the governed with 
the respect that citizens deserve.  It also provides agencies with more infor-
mation upon which to base their policy decisions.  Requiring agencies to give 
public justifications for their actions enhances transparency and accountabil-
ity to the public. While agencies must also offer a justification for choosing 
policy solutions based on a deal among competing interests, the reasons are 
after-the-fact justifications, rather than an effort to work through conflicting 
evidence and arguments in a genuine effort to choose the most appropriate 
regulation. The agency in the deliberative model aspires to be a kind of de-
mocratically-informed mandarin. 
The reader may be forgiven for asking whether the choice between the 
theories is just a matter of “You like tomato and I like tomahto.”26  After all, 
might not public participation serve both functions, fostering democratic de-
liberation and forcing agency policymaking to accommodate the interests of 
stakeholders, in some mixture that may not be readily discernible but is 
broadly acceptable?  
In one important negative sense, our hypothetical reader is right, and the 
choice does not matter.  Both theories fail if there is not a fair balance of 
stakeholders who participate in the process.  As Part III explains, this lack of 
a fair balance is a real problem – the proverbial elephant in the room men-
tioned earlier. To our minds, however, the choice matters because it concerns 
the degree of politics that is appropriate in administrative policymaking. 
These days, almost no one who thinks about the problem for more than a 
moment believes that significant administrative policymaking is merely a 
matter of adding expert knowledge of the facts to correct construction of the 
law.27  Perfect knowledge of every effect of a toxic pollutant at every level of 
  
 24. Id. 
 25. See Staszewksi, supra note 12, at 885-86 (noting that in the deliberative 
democratic model “political decisions should reflect the preferences that emerge from 
a process of reasoned deliberation, rather than the pre-political preferences of a major-
ity of citizens or the strength of competing interest group pressures.”). 
 26. ELLA FITZGERALD & LOUIS ARMSTRONG, Let’s Call the Whole Thing Off, on 
THE BEST OF ELLA FITZGERALD AND LOUIS ARMSTRONG (Verve 1997). 
 27. Some defenders of the New Deal insisted that agency discretion was not 
problematic because it would be exercised based on apolitical, scientific expertise.  
See William Funk, Public Participation and Transparency in Administrative Law – 
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exposure on everyone in the world cannot determine what level is low enough 
to be “safe.”  Administrative policymaking demands that agencies make 
value choices, and in a democracy, the agency should be politically account-
able for its choices.  But accepting these facts of administrative life does not 
settle the question of how the agency should make its choices in the first 
place.  Some bargaining is an inescapable part of regulating a complex and 
political world through complex and political bureaucracies; politics must 
bracket the discretion that an agency can exercise.  Still, within this policy 
space, we prefer that agencies implement their best judgments about how to 
proceed.  To put the matter another way, some agency rules, as appropriate as 
they may be, simply will not fly as a political matter.  So be it.  But, for the 
reasons we take up next, we prefer agencies to reach decisions without bar-
gaining over the result with stakeholders.   
Our definition of expertise is broad.  We recognize that scientific and 
social scientific methodologies, in practice, cannot make complex policymak-
ing into a completely objective affair. These methodologies, particularly cost-
benefit analysis, have not displaced the operation of politics, often lack accu-
racy, and are subject to being manipulated according to an analyst’s policy 
preferences.28  Moreover, claims about objectivity are simply “untenable in 
light of post-empiricism.”29  “[E]conomics (and other social sciences) [at best 
are] a mixture of empirical data and social construction.”30  Following on 
from this, experts are not limited to persons trained in scientific methodolo-
gies but include other professionals, particularly lawyers and public adminis-
trators, who rely on qualitative analysis to identify and justify regulatory solu-
tions.   
Our preference for public administration over political bargaining is 
rooted in a stubborn insistence that both details and aspirations matter.  
Choosing the “best” rule may, in many cases, prove to be a fearsomely com-
plex, uncertain, value-laden task.  Still, we contend that administrative exper-
  
Three Examples as an Object Lesson, 61 ADMIN. L. REV. 171, 177 (2009) [hereinafter 
Funk, Public Participation] (discussing the “[e]xperts . . . would know what to do” 
defense of the New Deal).  Some New Dealers, however, saw professionalism, not 
expertise, as the protection against abuse of discretion.  See Sidney Shapiro, Elizabeth 
Fisher & Wendy Wagner, The Enlightenment of Administrative Law: Looking Inside 
the Agency for Legitimacy, 47 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 463, 486-88 (2012) [hereinafter 
Shapiro, Fisher & Wagner, The Enlightenment of Administrative Law] (discussing 
how Progressives modified their original claim for objectivity).  
 28. See Sidney A. Shapiro & Christopher H. Schroeder, Beyond Cost-Benefit 
Analysis: A Pragmatic Reorientation, 32 HARV.  ENVTL. L. REV. 433, 450-59 (2008); 
see also Funk, Public Participation, supra note 27, at 182 (noting that the Reagan 
administration used cost-benefit analysis to push a deregulatory agenda and that the 
Clinton administration, rather than abandon this tool, instead used it to push its own 
agenda). 
 29. See Shapiro & Schroeder, supra note 28, at 460-62. 
 30. Id. at 461. 
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tise located in a discursive process of consultation with the public is the proc-
ess most likely to serve the public interest.  We support democratically in-
formed expert judgment over political trade-offs because we believe the for-
mer is more likely, generally speaking, to lead agencies to choose better, pub-
lic-regarding outcomes than the latter, which encourages lowest common 
denominator policymaking and distortion in favor of powerful, parochial 
interests.    
Why, however, think that an agency can determine the public interest 
better than other stakeholders?  This query goes back to the point that exper-
tise, sans values, cannot justify policy choices, or at least the type of policy 
choices that agencies must make.  For instance, we know that ingesting too 
much arsenic is very bad for people.  We do not have perfect information 
about this problem – i.e., we cannot track the dose response curve down to 
zero.  Also, this information does not tell us how much to spend to address 
any problems of arsenic ingestion – e.g., it does not tell us how much to 
spend to limit arsenic levels in drinking water in the American Southwest, 
where relatively high levels are naturally occurring.  Nonetheless, it should be 
easy for everyone to agree on a ban on adding arsenic to soft drinks for chil-
dren. 
Suppose, however, that an agency, after excluding such extreme possi-
bilities, concludes that “reasonable” people might accept an upper limit of 
arsenic in drinking water at somewhere between X and Y parts per million.   
Given that we are now within the regulatory range where contestable values 
come into play, what could be more sensible than allowing interested parties 
to strike a deal somewhere between these two levels?  
One problem with this approach is that it underestimates both the degree 
to which values and facts intertwine and the power of motivated reasoning 
(i.e., politics) to distort expert judgment.  Senator Patrick Moynihan famously 
remarked, “[e]veryone is entitled to his own opinion, but not to his own 
facts.”31  He may have been correct as a matter of principle, but, in practice, 
people find the facts they want.32 We therefore should not be surprised if a 
regulatory system that aspires to deal-making finds that the political aims of 
its strongest actors distort expertise more than in a system that aspires to ex-
pert identification and implementation by public servants of a broad public 
interest.33    
  
 31. DANIEL PATRICK MOYNIHAN: A PORTRAIT IN LETTERS OF AN AMERICAN 
VISIONARY 2 (Steven R. Weisman, ed., 1st ed. 2010).   
 32. As Upton Sinclair put the point, “[i]t is difficult to get a man to understand 
something, when his salary depends upon his not understanding it!”  UPTON 
SINCLAIR, I, CANDIDATE FOR GOVERNOR: AND HOW I GOT LICKED 109 (1935). 
 33. Cf. William Funk, When Smoke Gets in your Eyes: Regulatory Negotiation 
and the Public Interest – EPA’s Woodstove Standards, 18 ENVTL. L. 55, 95 (1987) 
(criticizing negotiated rulemaking (also known as “reg-neg”) on the ground that it 
excludes diffuse, disorganized interests from negotiations). 
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It also bears noting that maximizing the role of expert judgment (in-
formed by public participation) and minimizing pluralistic bargaining is 
broadly consistent with the kind of democracy we learned about in grammar 
school.  We’ve conducted no surveys on this point but nonetheless will haz-
ard that people expect agencies to use their authority to create the best poli-
cies they can rather than to coordinate deals among interest groups.    
Realistically, agencies operate in the pluralistic world of politics, requir-
ing them to accommodate pressures from all directions, be they from the 
White House, Congress, agencies themselves, or outside stakeholders with 
political influence. Nonetheless, we submit that the aspiration of regulators 
should be to create rules based on their best judgments of the broad public 
interest, minimizing the distorting effect of special interests. The democratic-
deliberation model embraces this aspiration, and it is therefore preferable to 
the interest-group representation model with its aspiration of deal making.  
III.  THE SOME-ARE-MORE-EQUAL-THAN-OTHERS PROBLEM OF 
PUBLIC PARTICIPATION IN AMERICAN RULEMAKING 
To an American legal mind, the most prominent example of public par-
ticipation legitimizing administrative policymaking is the notice-and-
comment rulemaking process of the United States’ Administrative Procedure 
Act (APA).34  The American experience with this process demonstrates that 
public participation schemes designed to democratize and improve the sub-
stance of administrative policymaking may distort outcomes in favor of pow-
erful special interests and away from expert, public-regarding results.  The 
short of the matter is that an even playing field cannot guarantee a competi-
tive game among players of unequal strength.  In aggregate, regulated parties 
have far more information and resources to bring to bear to affect administra-
tive policymaking than do public-interest organizations with no direct profit 
motive in a particular regulatory fight.  Agencies, often starved for resources 
themselves, may rely on regulated parties for information that, in the usual 
case, public-interest groups cannot be expected to review or correct.  Notice-
and-comment procedures create multiple pressure points that enable outsiders 
to distort agency judgment – the threat of judicial review being the most ob-
vious example.35  Regulated parties, as profit-motivated entities with direct, 
bottom-line stakes in rulemaking, have greater resources than public interest 
groups to manipulate these pressure points.  The upshot of this power imbal-
ance is that special interests can often manipulate the rulemaking process to 
favor their interests.36   
  
 34. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-59 (2006). 
 35. See, e.g., id. §§ 701-06 (2006) (establishing judicial review procedures for 
agency decisions). 
 36. This concern is not, of course, new.  See Stewart, supra note 23, at 1713 (“It 
has become widely accepted, not only by public interest lawyers, but by academic 
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In this section, we discuss the evolution of rulemaking doctrines to al-
low and encourage the participation of regulatory beneficiaries, usually repre-
sented by public interest groups, and the failure of these efforts to achieve a 
balanced rulemaking process.  We cannot measure the precise degree to 
which this imbalance causes agencies to adopt regulations that are more fa-
vorable to regulated entities than they would be with greater public interest 
participation, but there is evidence that this is the result. 
A. Cliff Notes History of Notice-and-Comment Rulemaking 
As originally contemplated back in 1946 when the APA was enacted, 
the notice-and-comment process was quite simple.37  In essence, the agency 
had to explain what it was thinking about regulating, give others a chance to 
say what they thought about the agency’s thoughts, and then wrap things up 
by justifying the agency’s ultimate regulatory choice.38  At the end of this 
process, a proper party who disliked the agency’s choice could challenge it on 
judicial review, where federal courts would test the rule’s legality.39  
This process remained a simple one until the “public interest” era of 
1965-75. During this time, to the lasting puzzlement of public choice schol-
ars, there was an explosion of legislation addressing widely publicized health, 
safety and environmental disasters.40  Afraid that what they had won in Con-
gress would be “lost in the halls of administrative agencies,” public interest 
advocates turned to the courts to head off capture.41  Judges responded by 
creating “a strong presumption that agency action and inaction were subject 
to judicial review,” by adopting liberalized standing requirements that permit-
ted public interest groups to sue agencies on behalf of regulatory beneficiaries 
and by requiring agencies to take a “hard look” at the evidence in the rule-
making record and to justify a rule in light of that evidence.42  This last re-
  
critics, legislators, judges, and even by some agency members, that the comparative 
overrepresentation of regulated or client interests in the process of agency decision 
results in a persistent policy bias in favor of these interests.”). 
 37. Administrative Procedure Act, ch. 324, Pub. L. No. 79-404, 60 Stat. 237 
(1946) (codified at 5 U.S.C. § 551-59).   
 38. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b), (c). 
 39. Id. §§ 701-06. 
 40. See MICHAEL PERTSCHUK, REVOLT AGAINST REGULATION: THE RISE AND 
PAUSE OF THE CONSUMER MOVEMENT 5 (1982) (noting Congress passed 25 laws 
regulating the business community between 1967 and 1973). 
 41. Sidney A. Shapiro, A Delegation Theory of the APA, 10 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 
89, 100 (1996). 
 42. Sidney A. Shapiro, Administrative Law After the Counter-Reformation: Re-
storing Faith in Pragmatic Government, 48 U. KAN. L. REV. 689, 694-95 (2000) 
[hereinafter Shapiro, Counter-Reformation]. 
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form was intended to ensure that agencies paid attention to the evidence that 
public interest groups had submitted.43 
These changes were manifestations in the rulemaking context of Profes-
sor Stewart’s “reformation” of American administrative law noted above.44  
Whereas the preceding administrative regime applied procedural require-
ments to protect private property and ensure “due process” for property own-
ers, the reformation sought to give all “affected interests” (i.e., regulatory 
beneficiaries) rights to participate in and influence agency proceedings.45  
The assumption of the reformation leaders was that this change would pro-
duce a pluralistic administrative process, one in which public interest groups 
could use their power to do battle with industry interests to shape administra-
tive outcomes.46  On a more than incidental note, Professor Stewart was dubi-
ous about the reformation’s chances for full success, predicting that inade-
quate resources and collective action problems would prevent adequate repre-
sentation of all interests significantly affected by a decision.47  It turns out 
that he was right.48 
In the decades since Professor Stewart’s article, notice-and-comment 
rulemaking in the United States has become much more complex and is now 
festooned with requirements for impact statements and cost-benefit analy-
sis.49  It is tempting to regard this increase in deliberative requirements as 
reflecting increasing prominence of the deliberative democracy account of 
agency legitimacy.  Ironically, they might be better understood as reflecting 
political efforts to control agency policymaking – either by slowing it down 
(paralysis-by-analysis) or by centralizing control in the White House via cost-
benefit analysis conducted by OIRA.50 
As notice-and-comment rulemaking increased in complexity and diffi-
culty, critics charged that the system was breaking down or becoming “ossi-
  
 43. See id. 
 44. See Stewart, supra note 23, at 1669; supra note 23 and accompanying text. 
 45. See Stewart, supra note 23, at 1760-61. 
 46. See id. at 1790. 
 47. See id. at 1763.  Professor Stewart was especially dubious of the prospects of 
notice-and-comment rulemaking as a means to enable participation of all affected 
interests.  Id. at 1775 (noting that public interest groups “have tended to scorn resort 
to rulemaking proceedings[,]” observing that “the content of rulemaking decisions is 
often largely determined in advance through a process of informal consultation in 
which organized interests may enjoy a preponderant influence”).  
 48. See infra Part III.B. 
 49. Shapiro, Counter-Reformation, supra note 42, at 706-08 (briefly describing 
the requirements of cost-benefit analysis and impact statements for rulemaking). 
 50. See Funk, Public Participation, supra note 27, at 182 (observing that the 
Reagan order requiring cost-benefit analysis by agencies, Exec. Order No. 12,291, 
“on its face . . . appeared to be a retreat to the Landis model of administrative exper-
tise,” but “in reality . . . was an attempt to assert presidential political control over an 
administrative state that had grown increasingly complex”). 
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fied.”51  In response to such problems, Professor Philip Harter led the charge 
for negotiated rulemaking or “reg-neg.”52  On this pluralistic approach, inter-
ested parties – including both regulated parties and beneficiaries – negotiate 
the terms of a rule.53  After these parties reach a consensus, the agency runs 
the rule through notice-and-comment, which, in theory, should prove straight 
forward as all the relevant interests have already worked out their differ-
ences.54  Congress provided express authorization for agencies to pursue this 
type of rulemaking process in the Negotiated Rulemaking Act of 1990.55  Yet, 
reg-neg has been controversial since its inception.  Its supporters, led by Pro-
fessor Harter, claim that it provides an efficient means to develop better rules 
with greater “buy-in” from interested parties.56  Its critics worry that it can 
lead to illegal rules that sell out the public interest.57  Perhaps most notably, 
notwithstanding all the fanfare, agencies very rarely use reg-neg, which has 
not lived up to whatever potential it may have had to move rulemaking in the 
direction of the pluralistic model.58  
  
 51. Some twenty years on, we are still debating whether rulemaking has ossified 
or not.  See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Lauren E. Baer, The Continuum of Deference: 
Supreme Court Treatment of Agency Statutory Interpretations from Chevron to Ham-
dan, 96 GEO. L.J. 1083, 1179 (2008) (reviewing ossification debate and concluding 
that “the ossification concern is genuine even if indeterminate”). 
 52. See generally Philip J. Harter, Negotiating Regulations: A Cure for Malaise, 
71 GEO. L.J. 1 (1982). 
 53. Funk, Public Participation, supra note 27, at 175. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Pub. L. No. 101-648, 104 Stat. 4970 (1990) (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. 
§§ 561-70 (2006)). 
 56. See, e.g., Philip J. Harter, Assessing the Assessors: The Actual Performance 
of Negotiated Rulemaking, 9 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 32, 38-39 (2000) (“Negotiated rule-
making has proven enormously successful in developing agreements in highly polar-
ized situations and has enabled the parties to address the best, most effective, or most 
efficient way of solving a regulatory controversy.”); Jody Freeman & Laura I. Lang-
bein, Regulatory Negotiation and the Legitimacy Benefit, 9 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 60, 63 
(2000) (contending that reg-neg confers added legitimacy to rules). 
 57. See, e.g., William Funk, Bargaining Toward the New Millennium: Regula-
tory Negotiation and the Subversion of the Public Interest, 46 DUKE L.J. 1351, 1373-
74 (1997) (contending that reg-neg provides too much power to private parties at the 
expense of agencies); Michael McCloskey, Problems with Using Collaboration to 
Shape Environmental Public Policy, 34 VAL. U. L. REV. 423, 434 (2000) (contending 
that “[t]urning over the power of government to collaboratives is misguided and a 
departure from democratic ideals”); see also Cary Coglianese, Assessing Consensus: 
The Promise and Performance of Negotiated Rulemaking, 46 DUKE L.J. 1255, 1257-
59 (1997) (concluding, based on empirical study, that reg-neg does not attain its “in-
strumental goals . . .  of saving [rulemaking] time or reducing litigation”). 
 58. See, e.g., Dorit Rubinstein Reiss, Account Me In: Agencies in Quest of Ac-
countability, 19 J.L. & POL’Y 611, 675-76 (2011) (noting the rarity of negotiated 
rulemaking and suggesting this rarity may be due to agency incentives). 
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B.  The Asymmetry 
A number of empirical studies have found that business interests domi-
nate rulemaking, as measured by the number of rulemakings in which various 
interests filed comments or by the relative number of comments that were 
filed in rulemakings.59  The latest and most comprehensive study, by Profes-
sor Wendy Wagner and her coauthors, confirmed these results in a study of 
ninety hazardous air pollutant rulemakings at the Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA).60  On average, industry filed over 81% of the comments sub-
mitted concerning a proposed rule;61 public interest groups filed comments in 
less than 50% of the rulemakings;62 and industry interests had an average of 
at least 170 times more information communications with EPA staff (meet-
ings, phone calls, letters, etc.) than did public interest groups during the pe-
riod before the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (pre-NPRM period).63   
White House review of significant rules, which occurs at OIRA, rein-
forces or even exacerbates existing pluralistic imbalances.64  Professor Rena 
Steinzor and her coauthors from the Center of Progressive Reform (CPR) 
found that 65% of the participants in 1,080 meetings at ORIA were from in-
dustry interests, which was 5 times the number of attendees who represented 
public interest groups.65  Of the lawyers, consultants and lobbyists who at-
tended these meetings, nearly 95% represented business interests, as com-
pared to 2.5% who represented public interest groups.66  Corporate interests 
  
 59. See Shapiro, Complexity of Regulatory Capture, supra note 20, at 237-38 
(describing studies of industry dominance). 
 60. Wagner, Barnes & Peters, supra note 13, at 128. 
 61. Id.  The number of industry comments also greatly outnumbered public in-
terest comments for those rules where there were public interest comments.  Industry 
filed an average of 35 comments per rule, while public interest groups filed an aver-
age of 2.4 comments per rule.  Id. at 128-29. 
 62. Id. at 128. 
 63. Id. at 125.  Industry interests had an average of 84 contacts per rule as com-
pared to an average of 0.7 contacts for public interest groups.  Id. 
 64. For a recent anecdote on this point, consider John M. Broder, New Proposal 
on Fracking Gives Ground to Industry, N.Y. TIMES (May 4, 2012), http:/ 
/www.nytimes.com/2012/05/05/us/new-fracking-rule-is-issued-by-obama-
administration.html (explaining that proposed rule requiring oil and natural gas com-
panies to disclose the cocktail of chemicals they inject into the ground as part of 
“fracking” was “sharp[ly] changed” to allow disclosure after rather than before drill-
ing after oil industry lobbyists “met with officials of the Office of Management and 
Budget, who reworked the rule to address industry concerns about overlapping state 
regulations and the cost of compliance”). 
 65. RENA STEINZOR, CTR. FOR PROGRESSIVE REFORM, BEHIND CLOSED DOORS AT 
THE WHITE HOUSE: HOW POLITICS TRUMPS PROTECTION OF PUBLIC HEALTH, WORKER 
SAFETY, AND THE ENVIRONMENT 18-19 (2011), http://www.progressivereform.org 
/articles/OIRA_Meetings_1111.pdf. 
 66. Id.  
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also met alone with OIRA far more often.  Seventy percent (70%) of the more 
than 1,000 meetings involved only industry interests, while only 7% involved 
only public interests.67  
While the evidence is not conclusive, the evidence we have shows an 
imbalance between public interest and private interest representation in the 
rulemaking process.  This imbalance occurs both at agencies and at OIRA 
concerning its review of proposed and final rules. 
C.  The Consequences 
On either an interest-representation or a deliberative-democratic model, 
severe asymmetry in public participation is not a good thing.  If agencies (and 
OIRA) are bargaining with stakeholders, industry interests have a greater 
opportunity to influence the rulemaking process.  If agencies are relying on 
public comments for rulemaking information, the potential exists for  “filter 
failure,” which Professor Wagner has identified as an ironic result of the ref-
ormation’s efforts to expand public participation.  Because the courts expect 
an agency to respond to all significant comments,68 it cannot “shield itself 
from this flood of information and focus on developing its own expert con-
ception of the project.”69  This expectation presents a problem in which 
asymmetrical information overwhelms the agency and influences the out-
come.70   
Still, to what extent do we know for sure that asymmetric corporate par-
ticipation in the rulemaking process bends rules toward industry concerns and 
preferences and away from the public interest?71  Most observers assume this 
overwhelming asymmetry produces outcomes that favor industry interests,72 
and the evidence is supportive, but not conclusive, that the assumption is 
  
 67. Id. at 21. 
 68. See United States v. Nova Scotia Food Prods. Corp., 568 F.2d 240, 245 (2d 
Cir. 1977) (reversing an FDA regulation governing good practices for whitefish in 
part because the FDA failed to respond to an important technical comment in its final 
rule); see also Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 
29, 43 (1983) (holding that an “agency must examine the relevant data and articulate a 
satisfactory explanation for its action”).   
 69. Wendy E. Wagner, Administrative Law, Filter Failure, and Information 
Capture, 59 DUKE L.J. 1321, 1325 (2010). 
 70. Id. at 1342. 
 71. The famous quote from Charles Erwin Wilson, former Secretary of Defense 
and CEO of General Motors comes to mind – “for years I thought what was good for 
our country was good for General Motors and vice versa.”  See Justin Hyde, GM’s 
“Engine Charlie” Wilson Learned to Live with a Misquote, DETROIT FREE PRESS 
(Sept. 14, 2008), http://www.freep.com/article/20080914/BUSINESS01/809140308 
/GM-s-Engine-Charlie-Wilson-learned-live-misquote. 
 72. See Shapiro, Complexity of Regulatory Capture, supra note 20, at 234-41 
(noting comments of observers). 
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accurate.  The Wagner study found EPA mostly changed rules in the direction 
favored by industry.73  Other studies have found a similar result,74 but there 
are also studies that have not found a connection between industry dominance 
and changes favorable to industry.75   
There is less empirical evidence regarding the impact of the representa-
tional asymmetry on OIRA.  We do know that it is OIRA’s habit to oppose 
stringent regulation,76 but analysts have failed to link the greater industry 
presence to changes in rules in favor of industry.77  The absence of this con-
nection leads some analysts to doubt that the White House uses the review 
process to deliver benefits to powerful interests,78 but we are not so sure.  
First, OIRA often leaves no fingerprints, making it difficult to verify empiri-
cally a bias in favor of industry.  
It is supposed to operate under transparency rules, but it has found ways 
to avoid these rules.79  Second, the many meetings between industry interests 
and OIRA undoubtedly are about regulatory costs, and the public interest 
community lacks an equal opportunity to focus OIRA on regulatory bene-
fits.80   
  
 73. Wagner, Barnes & Peters, supra note 13, at 130 (noting comments raised an 
average of 22 significant issues in each rulemaking, and EPA on average made 
changes to the final rule concerning about one-half of these issues.  Of the changes 
made, 83 percent of them weakened the rule in some manner). 
 74. See Shapiro, Complexity of Regulatory Capture, supra note 20, at 239 n.82 
(describing the studies). 
 75. Id. at 240 n.85 (describing the studies). 
 76. See Shapiro & Schroeder, supra note 28, at 450-51 (discussing evidence of 
OMB bias).  
 77. See Steven Croley, White House Review of Agency Rulemaking: An Empiri-
cal Investigation, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 821, 858-60, 877 (2003) (finding that OIRA 
sought changes in politically controversial rules, but finding that the type of interest 
group that attended a meeting with OIRA officials did not predict whether OIRA 
would change the rule or accept it as is).  
 78. See, e.g., id. at 858-60. 
 79. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, NO. GAO-03-929, RULEMAKING: 
OMB’S ROLE IN REVIEWS OF AGENCIES’ DRAFT RULES AND THE TRANSPARENCY OF 
THOSE REVIEWS 7 (2003), http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d03929.pdf (finding “nei-
ther OIRA nor the agencies are required to disclose why rules are withdrawn from 
review, and the descriptions that OIRA discloses about its contacts with outside par-
ties is often not very helpful” and that “neither [OIRA] nor the rulemaking agencies 
are required to disclose the changes made to rules while they are under informal re-
view – the period in which OIRA said it can have its greatest effect”). 
 80. See Shapiro, Complexity of Regulatory Capture, supra note 20, at 241 (not-
ing that industry lobbying tends to confirm an overemphasis on costs among OIRA 
analysts). 
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IV.  NEW NETWORKS, SIMILAR PROBLEM? 
One lesson of the preceding discussion of American rulemaking is that 
procedures designed to increase the influence of a broad range of interest 
groups can have the unhappy effect of empowering those already most pow-
erful.  We are interested in learning whether this lesson transposes to interna-
tional and global developments in administrative law.  Along these lines, this 
section briefly considers how two noteworthy developments, new governance 
initiatives and increasing reliance on global administrative agencies, might 
impact public participation and mitigate or worsen the problem of clout.  
A.  New Governance Networks 
The new governance movement is complex and multifaceted,81 and we 
cannot begin to do it justice in this short Article.  But, we can raise a caution-
ary note or two about the project in light of our concerns about clout.  New 
governance scholars seek to create new regulatory networks that foster ongo-
ing dialogue among stakeholders to develop and continually improve “gov-
ernance.”  Professor Orly Lobel, for example, notes new governance reforms 
are “based on engaging multiple actors and shifting citizens from passive to 
active roles,” thereby pluralizing the “exercise of normative authority.”82  
This effort to empower a range of interests naturally calls to mind the great 
administrative law “reformation” of the 1960s and 70s.83  It calls to mind 
even more directly the debates over reg-neg that followed.84   
Given this American experience, two points seem especially salient.  
First, the evidence we reviewed earlier suggests that systems that rely on 
voluntary participation by varied interests to inform and legitimize regulation 
(or “governance,” as the case may be) will often be dominated, just as public 
choice scholars would predict, by special interests with profits on the line.85     
Second, and on a very closely related point, we see some new govern-
ance scholars veering towards the bargaining paradigm and away from the 
deliberation model we prefer.  For those scholars, the job of the bureaucracy 
is to “steer” policy networks towards solutions to regulatory problems,86 mak-
  
 81. We sympathize with Professor David Zaring’s remark on New Governance 
that “[i]t is often difficult to understand what this means, amid all the iterative proc-
esses and dialogic benchmarking.”  David Zaring, Fateful Bankers, 159 U. PA. L. 
REV. PENNUMBRA 303, 307 (2011). 
 82. Orly Lobel, The Renew Deal: The Fall of Regulation and the Rise of Gov-
ernance in Contemporary Legal Thought, 89 MINN. L. REV. 342, 373 (2004). 
 83. See supra notes 44-48 and accompanying text. 
 84. See supra notes 51-59-and accompanying text. 
 85. See supra Part III.B. 
 86. See Bignami, supra note 10, at 869-70 (noting that in the new governance 
understanding, “the task of public administration has been scaled back considerably – 
from commanding, to persuading and steering”). 
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ing it an alternative version of the administrative pluralism endorsed by the 
reformation.  To be fair, the intention of these reforms is to create institu-
tional locations for decision making that focus on problem solving.87  But we 
are not clear how these arrangements will not degenerate into a bargaining 
process. 
Concerning this objection, we note the endorsement by new governance 
scholars of regulatory negotiation as preferable to traditional rulemaking.88  
In one sense we agree.  If reg-neg employs a procedure requiring that all par-
ticipants agree to the outcome and all interests are fully represented, it ad-
dresses the clout problem about which we are concerned.  But, even with full 
representation, we still have the problem that regulatory negotiation, after all, 
is based on negotiation.  Perhaps participants regard the endeavor as seeking 
a solution to the problem at hand, but at the end of the day they are there rep-
resenting their own interests, a problem that can be avoided if the agency, not 
the participants, designs a rule.  This concern over bargaining seems espe-
cially problematic because there is no reason to expect that the asymmetry in 
power relationships that affects rulemaking will not also impact new govern-
ance initiatives.89   
We have neither the information nor the inclination to condemn the new 
governance project.  If, as promised, all stakeholders are represented, and if 
all participants must agree to the outcome (thereby negating clout), it may be 
a second-best approach to having an agency write a rule.  We suspect that, as 
has been the case with reg-neg, new governance techniques probably can 
work well in some contexts but not so well in many others.  Determining how 
well new governance is “working” in a given context is likely to be a time-
consuming, value-laden affair. We understand that this approach is more 
common in Europe,90 and perhaps Europe can therefore provide evidence as 
to how well new governance addresses the problem of clout.  
  
 87. See, e.g., Jody Freeman, Collaborative Governance in the Administrative 
State, 45 UCLA L. REV. 1, 23-27 (1997). 
 88. See, e.g., id. at 33-66 (describing and endorsing negotiated-rulemaking as a 
good example of new governance techniques). 
 89. See John M. Conley & Cynthia A. Williams, Engage, Embed, and Embellish: 
Theory Versus Practice in the Corporate Social Responsibility Movement, 31 J. CORP. 
L. 1, 33 (2005) (“If it is economic power which ground[s] the capacity of non-state 
actors to govern or coerce, there is no reason to believe that those actors’ motive or 
opportunity would diminish in a post-regulatory environment.”) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
 90. The following anecdote seems worth sharing for whatever it may be worth.  
During a conversation with a highly able and well-informed agency official with 
substantial responsibilities for rulemaking, Murphy inquired whether the official’s 
agency was experimenting with any “new governance” techniques.  With complete 
candor, the agency official responded, “What’s ‘new governance’?”  
17
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B.  Global Networks  
Globalized administrative law embeds agencies in international net-
works for the identification of, if not the choice of, regulatory policies.  As 
with new governance initiatives, these developments are complex and multi-
faceted, and we do not expect that we can do an adequate job of capturing 
these nuances in a few pages of this short Article.  But we can once again 
raise the issue of whether reliance on global networks reduces or increases the 
problem of clout.  
1.  International Standard Setting Organizations 
The United States is required by its international agreements to base its 
sanitary and phytosanitary regulations on international standards, guidelines, 
or recommendations,91 and to use international standards (or parts of a stan-
dard) as a basis for technical regulations.92 Consistent with these obligations, 
the National Technology Transfer and Advancement Act of 1995 promotes 
the use of voluntary standards,93 which can be the basis of harmonization 
efforts, and the 1997 Food and Drug Administration (FDA) Modernization 
Act encourages FDA to participate in international harmonization efforts.94  
An OMB circular requires all agencies to “use voluntary consensus standards, 
both domestic and international, in [their] regulatory and procurement activi-
ties” as a means of carrying out policy objectives.95  
Reliance on international standards may reduce the impact of clout in 
the rulemaking process.  To the extent that the international standards consti-
tute expert judgments reached without undue political influence, such stan-
dards offer a way for agencies to fend off industry clout by utilizing the inter-
national work product.  But we know from domestic experience with volun-
tary standards that the product often reflects the lowest common denominator 
  
 91. See WORLD TRADE ORG., Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and 
Phytosanitary Measures, art. 3.1, in THE LEGAL TEXTS: THE RESULTS OF THE 
URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS 59, 60 (1999) [hereinaf-
ter THE LEGAL TEXTS]. 
 92. See WORLD TRADE ORG., Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, art. 
2.4, in THE LEGAL TEXTS, supra note 91, at 121, 122. 
 93. 15 U.S.C. § 3701 (2006) (calling on Federal agencies to consult and partici-
pate with voluntary, private sector businesses to develop technical standards). 
 94. 21 U.S.C. § 383(c)(3) (requiring the Secretary of Health and Human Services 
(HHS), in which FDA is located, to work with other foreign governments to reach an 
agreement on regulations). 
 95. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, OMB 
CIRCULAR NO. A-119, FEDERAL PARTICIPATION IN THE DEVELOPMENT AND USE OF 
VOLUNTARY CONSENSUS STANDARDS AND IN CONFORMITY ASSESSMENT ACTIVITIES, 
reprinted in 63 Fed. Reg. 8546-01 (Feb. 19, 1998) (listing policies of the OMB Circu-
lar A-119). 
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about which agreement can be reached, usually because industry is involved 
in the standard-setting process and it operates according to consensus.96  In-
dustry involvement robs the standard of a precautionary tilt that may be ap-
propriate according to an agency’s mandate.  This effect would seem to be 
less of a problem if the international standard is only technical – such as how 
cell phones talk to each other – but it would seem to be more of a problem 
regarding health, safety, and environmental standards.97   
So, once again, more information is needed.  Are some processes more 
likely to lead to public-regarding results than others?  Do multinational com-
panies have clout in the process?  Is global harmonization a plot by multina-
tional companies to adopt international, neoliberal governance regimes, as 
many of the left believe?  (Okay, that was a bit provocative, but the appear-
ance of a lack of public participation appears to be at the core of this distrust.) 
2.  Bilateral and Multilateral Negotiations 
The beginning of this Article refers to an executive order entitled, “Pro-
moting International Regulatory Cooperation.”98  Among other things, this 
order charges a Regulatory Working Group chaired by the Administrator of 
OIRA with the task of developing and issuing guidelines on international 
harmonization of regulation.99  Of course, international harmonization of 
regulations is not a new idea,100 and it has obvious capacity to create effi-
ciency.  Also, if we start from the premise that American health and safety 
regulation is too lax, then harmonization with stronger regulators at least 
poses the possibility of improving American regulations.  
Still, harmonization raises obvious concerns as well.  Once the United 
States has negotiated a harmonized standard, domestic regulatory agencies, 
such as EPA and OSHA, will comply with the APA rulemaking procedures.  
Literal compliance with the APA procedures may be ineffective, however, in 
the harmonization context.  The APA does not require an agency to seek pub-
  
 96. Sidney A. Shapiro & Randy Rabinowitz, Voluntary Regulatory Compliance 
in Theory and Practice: The Case of OSHA, 52 ADMIN. L. REV. 97, 137 (2000) (find-
ing “private standard-setting organizations tend to be ‘business-oriented’ and ‘indus-
try-dominated,’ and private standards therefore reflect ‘the lowest common denomi-
nator of acceptance by interested private groups’”). 
 97. See, e.g., Lori M. Wallach, Accountable Governance in the Era of Globaliza-
tion: The WTO, NAFTA and International Harmonization of Standards, 50 U. KAN. L.  
REV. 823, 838 (2002) (stating “[a] significant number of Codex standards are weaker 
than food standards in the United States” and giving examples). 
 98. Promoting International Regulatory Cooperation, Exec. Oder No. 1,360,977, 
77 Fed. Reg. 26413 (May 1, 2012). 
 99. Id. § 2(e), at 26413. 
 100. See, e.g., Shapiro, supra note 6, at 438-39 (describing efforts to develop a 
harmonized system of chemical classification and labeling, known as the “globally 
harmonized system” (GHS)). 
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lic input in advance of agreeing to a harmonized standard, and once such a 
standard exists there is an international commitment by the United States to 
adopt it.101  It seems logical to infer that such commitments magnify further 
the tendency of agencies to avoid changes to their proposed rules during the 
public rulemaking process.   
This fait accompli problem raises the issue of influence and balance 
among stakeholders during the international harmonization process that pre-
cedes the domestic rulemaking process. To the extent that public participation 
is allowed as part of harmonization, moving to an international or global con-
text would seem, as a general matter, to make both monitoring and participat-
ing in a regulatory process more expensive.  Speaking from an American 
perspective, regulated entities, or their trade associations, will have the 
wherewithal to participate in public harmonization activities, even if they are 
located across the world from Washington, D.C.  Many, if not most, public 
interest groups will lack this capacity.  We have already seen that public in-
terest groups are disadvantaged concerning domestic rulemaking,102 and it is 
likely that the foreign location of harmonization activity would worsen this 
imbalance still more.   
All of this suggests that work needs to be done in creating an adminis-
trative process for harmonization efforts, one that at least gives public interest 
groups the opportunity to weigh in on such activities even if resource issues 
hinder their participation.  So, we say to scholars working on global adminis-
trative law, is this an issue on your agenda?  Should it be?  What are the op-
portunities for corporate interests to influence international harmonization 
activities?  Should we expect asymmetries in participation to be even worse 
than in domestic rulemaking?  If so, what should be done about it?   
V.  A CLOSING THOUGHT:  BECOMING PROGRESSIVE AGAIN 
As students of American administrative law, we are concerned that 
American notice-and-comment rulemaking is distorted by (mostly corporate) 
  
 101. The newly revivified Administrative Conference of the United States 
(ACUS), a small federal agency charged with studying administrative processes to 
recommend improvements, recently addressed this problem.  See ADMIN. 
CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE RECOMMENDATION 2011-6: 
INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY COOPERATION ¶ 7, at 8 (2011), http://www.acus.gov 
/recommendation/international-regulatory-cooperation.  More specifically, ACUS 
recommended that an agency “engaged in such [international harmonization] consul-
tations should describe those consultations in its notices of proposed rulemaking, 
rulemaking records, and statements of basis and purpose under the Administrative 
Procedure Act.”  Id.  Agencies should also “seek input and participation from inter-
ested parties as appropriate, through either formal means such as Federal Register 
notices and requests for comments or informal means such as outreach to regulated 
industries, consumers, and other stakeholders.”  Id. 
 102. See supra Part III.B. 
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clout, and we are curious to learn how clout may be affecting new governance 
initiatives as well as international and global policymaking.  But what then is 
to be done?   
We certainly do not mean to suggest as a general matter that agencies 
forgo public participation because of potential imbalances in usage.  Public 
participation certainly can enable a fuller range of interests to be represented 
during rulemaking – as the interest-representation model of legitimacy con-
templates. Properly structured public participation can also foster dialogue 
among interested parties and greater deliberation, especially by the agency – 
just as the democratic deliberation model contemplates.   
Notwithstanding these advantages, however, it stands to reason that, 
where effective public participation requires resources, it will tend to tilt the 
playing field in favor of those who begin the process already powerful.  One 
type of answer to this problem might be to remove the resource problem – 
e.g., through government funding of public advocacy groups.103  In the 
United States, the likelihood of a wholehearted embrace of such an approach 
seems vanishingly remote.   
Another older solution that we favor is perhaps almost as unlikely.  The 
Progressives saw government, and an expert bureaucracy, as a countervailing 
power to corporate influence.104  Insofar as this vision was premised on tech-
nocratic experts finding value-neutral responses to regulatory problems, it has 
long been rejected.105  Nonetheless, the Progressives were right that we need 
experts in the public employ to play a lead role in determining policies that 
implicate technical and scientific facts.  Moreover, decision making based on 
professionalism, discursive public input, and reason giving has the potential 
to contribute to the legitimization of public administration, although this point 
tends to be overlooked in the administrative law literature.106 
But for an agency to play this role, which requires more than mere coor-
dination of a result among participating interest groups dominated by indus-
try, it must have sufficient resources.  With sufficient resources, many of the 
deformities associated with public participation in rulemaking (at least in its 
dominant American incarnation) become less important.  For instance, reli-
ance on corporations for information becomes less of a problem where an 
  
 103. See NAN ARON, LIBERTY AND JUSTICE FOR ALL: PUBLIC INTEREST LAW IN 
THE 1980S AND BEYOND 53-54 (1989) (documenting substantial decline in govern-
ment funding for public interest advocacy). 
 104. See supra notes 27-30and accompanying text. 
 105. See supra Part III.A (documenting the transformation of political theories to 
administrative law). 
 106. See Shapiro, Fisher & Wagner, The Enlightenment of Administrative Law, 
supra note 27, at 465 (discussing a “discursive” model of public administration as an 
overlooked supplement to traditional administrative sources of legitimacy); Sidney A. 
Shapiro & Ronald F. Wright, The Future of the Administrative Presidency: Turning 
Administrative Law Inside-Out, 65 U. MIAMI L. REV. 577, 587-90 (2010) (discussing 
the potential that professionalism can legitimize administrative action). 
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agency has the power, resources, and competence to confirm this information.  
Also, an agency with sufficient resources will be less likely to “give in” to 
some corporate complaints in the comment process as a matter of triage rather 
than merits.  In sum, earlier in this Article, we expressed our preference for a 
deliberative democratic model of agency policymaking; for such a model to 
work, agencies need the resources to deliberate right. 
This situation does not exist in the United States today.  Generally 
speaking, Congress refuses to give agencies the resources they need to dis-
charge their responsibilities.  Over the last several decades, the civil service 
has been “hollowed out” by budget cuts and retirements.107  Many insist that 
Congress, the White House, and the judiciary have made this problem worse 
by larding the rulemaking process with impact statements and cost-benefit 
analysis.108  The increasing number of political appointees who staff their 
higher ranks rather than career public servants has further undermined the 
ability of agencies to function as experts.109  This last shift might be broadly 
acceptable if an agency’s job were to coordinate interest groups to develop 
policy in a faux legislative manner.  It is in obvious tension with the exercise 
of “neutral” expertise, however.    
Public participation in rulemaking does not occur in an institutional vac-
uum.  For it to work as best it can, it requires the complement of an expert 
agency with sufficient resources.  In the United States, “fixing” public par-
ticipation in rulemaking thus requires revitalization of the civil service.  This 
result does not seem likely in today’s political and economic climate, with its 
budget cutting and slashing of government.  But we leave the problem of 
implementing our prescription for another day. 
 
  
 107. See RENA STEINZOR & SIDNEY SHAPIRO, THE PEOPLE’S AGENTS AND THE 
BATTLE TO PROTECT THE AMERICAN PUBLIC: SPECIAL INTERESTS, GOVERNMENT, AND 
THREATS TO HEALTH, SAFETY AND THE ENVIRONMENT 54-71 (2010) (discussing hol-
low government and its impact on protecting the public). 
 108. See Thomas O. McGarity, Some Thoughts on “Deossifying” the Rulemaking 
Process, 41 DUKE L.J. 1385, 1400-13 (1992). 
 109. See Shapiro & Wright, supra note 106, at 583, 608-16 (discussing the in-
crease in the number of political appointees and the adverse impact on public admini-
stration). 
22
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 78, Iss. 2 [2013], Art. 7
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol78/iss2/7
